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BYE, BYE, BILINGUALS: THE REMOVAL OF ENGLISH-
SPANISH BILINGUALS FROM THE CRIMINAL JURY AND LATINO 
DISCRIMINATION 
ASHLEY RICH
In 1954, the United States Supreme Court issued a landmark opinion 
in Hernandez v. Texas that the equal protection guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment applied not only to African-Americans, but also to 
other groups, specifically Mexican-Americans. The Court stated that 
systematically excluding Mexican-Americans from a jury deprived 
Hernandez of his right to be tried by a jury of his peers. Following 
Hernandez though, the Supreme Court and other U.S. courts have handed 
down opinion after opinion allowing for peremptory strikes based on 
English-Spanish bilingualism, a defining trait of the United States Latino 
population. By allowing these strikes, Courts are largely excluding Latinos 
from juries and engaging in de facto discrimination which is illegal under 
Hernandez and now additionally Batson v. Kentucky. As the Latino and 
Spanish speaking population of the United States, and thus Texas, 
continues to grow, the United States justice system must change course in 
order to include these citizens and respect their constitutional rights.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“One language sets you in a corridor for life. Two languages open every 
door along the way.”1
Language is perhaps the most important part of daily human life. It 
governs the ability to communicate and interact with the world around us; 
the ability to be a part of society. “Similar to sex and race, language is a 
characteristic vital to human perception,” and the determination of one’s 
place in that society.2 Speaking a different language than the majority of 
the society is likely to put a person in a position of vulnerability. People 
who speak a different language are unable to fully integrate because of this 
lack of communication. Conversely, speaking multiple languages allows a 
person to full integrate into multiple societies; to find more ‘doors’ into the 
world around them. 
The largest gatekeeper in the United States justice system is the Eng-
lish language. For those accused of a crime, lacking the ability to profi-
ciently speak English means that they will have to rely on the help of others 
through the entire adjudication process. They lose the ability to advocate 
effectively for themselves and have to rely on the abilities of courtroom 
interpreters. Other players in the criminal justice system, such as jurors, are 
also barred from fully participating because of language differences. In 
theory, this loss of agency should not apply to bilingual Americans who are 
interacting with the justice system. While they additionally speak another 
language, their proficiency in English should open doors, not close them. 
 1.  FRANK SMITH, TO THINK: IN LANGUAGE, LEARNING AND EDUCATION (1992). 
 2.  Graham Douds, International Human Rights Implications of Voir Dire Discrimination: 
Critical Examination of Contemporary Language Qualifications in Criminal Proceedings, 47 RE.
JURIDICA U. INTER. P.R. 715, 727 (2012). 
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Unfortunately, this is not the reality for bilingual Americans wanting to 
serve on certain criminal juries. Following the Supreme Court decision in 
Hernandez v. New York, jurors who are bilingual in English and Spanish 
may be struck by a peremptory challenge and removed from juries if a case 
involves both Spanish and English evidence.3 This ruling, both directly and 
in its effect, has allowed for the mass removal of Latino jurors from Amer-
ican criminal juries. 
The allowance of peremptory challenges against English-Spanish bi-
lingual jurors by the Supreme Court of the United States in Hernandez v. 
New York is de facto discrimination against Latino Americans which vio-
lates the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment, amounts to the 
legal recognition of a current community prejudice against individuals of a 
certain national origin as prohibited by the Court almost 70 years ago in 
Hernandez v. Texas, and is against good public policy in the United States, 
and specifically the Texas. 
II. LATINOS IN THE UNITED STATES AND BILINGUALISM
According to the United States Census Bureau, the Latino population 
of the United States as of July 1, 2017 was 58.9 million.4 Of this group, 
11.4 million Latino people live in Texas making up 39.6% of the state’s 
population.5 By 2060, the Latino population is projected to increase to 119 
million, a 115% increase, and make up 29% of the U.S. population as a 
whole.6 Not only will Latino people make up over one-quarter of the Unit-
ed States population, they will also make up 33.5% of the under 18 years 
old population.7 The Latino population is also projected to have a down-
ward shift in the percentage of people born outside the United States; 
45.8% of the population in 2014 to 41.6% in 2060.8 While birth place is not 
synonymous with citizenship, a larger population of native born Latino 
people will increase the percentage of the overall population that is U.S. 
citizens. 
 3.  500 U.S. 352 (1991). 
 4.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HISPANIC HERITAGE MONTH 2018: PROFILE AMERICA FACTS (2018), 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/visualizations/2018/comm/hispanic-fff-2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P8H2-RR8Y]. 
 5.  Fast Facts as of July 1, 2018, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2018), 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045219 [https://perma.cc/R432-HQTS]. 
 6.  SANDRA L. COLBY & JENNIFER M. ORTMAN, PROJECTIONS OF THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION
OF THE U.S. POPULATION: 2014-2060, 9 (2015) 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2015/demo/p25-1143.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W5TJ-Y386]. .  
 7.  Id. at 10. 
 8.  Id. at 12. 
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According to a 2013 Pew Research Center survey, 36% of Latino 
adults identify as English-Spanish bilingual.9 This percentage varies with 
age. Adults in the traditional ‘middle-aged’ bracket currently have the low-
est rates of bilingualism, while adults 18-29 and those that are 60+ have 
over 40% of their respective populations identifying as bilingual.10 Interest-
ingly, English-Spanish bilingualism currently peaks with the second Latino 
generation in the United States.11 In this group, over 50% identify as bilin-
gual, which can often be attributed to this population straddling the cultures 
and languages of the United States and their parents during childhood.12
This statistic has the potential to be extremely interesting for the future of 
the Spanish language in the United States, and especially Texas, when 
looking at the large waves of migration of Spanish speakers currently at the 
U.S. border. 
During the language survey, 95% of Latino adults agreed that it was 
“important for future generations of U.S. Hispanics to speak Spanish.”13
Why is Spanish language so important to the Latino population in the Unit-
ed States? Researcher Carlos Santos stated this desire succinctly: “[The 
Spanish language] is a connection to their culture, their parents, their ances-
tors and their history. It is part of who they are, who they were and who 
they will be.”14 Historically, in the United States it has been understood 
that “language, like religion and other protected classes outside race or sex, 
help[s] form associational identity.”15 For many Latino people, Spanish 
language is the basis for an identity that is ever changing in the United 
States socio-political landscape and while a large percentage of Latinos say 
that learning English is extremely important, they do not want Spanish to 
disappear from their families lives.16 Spanish is not only a language, but in 
fact a part of their racial makeup. This proliferation of Spanish-language in 
Latino-American culture is evident from the fact that 97% of all bilingual 
 9.  PEW RESEARCH CTR., 2013 SURVEY OF U.S. LATINOS (2013), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/dataset/2013-national-survey-of-latinos/. 
 10.  Id.
 11.  Id.
 12.  Id.
 13.  Id.
 14.  Christopher F. Bagnato, Change is Needed: How Latinos are Affected by the Process of Jury 
Selection, 29 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 59, 67 (2010).  
 15.  Douds, supra note 2, at 747. 
 16.  Bagnato, supra note 14, at 67. 
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Spanish speakers in the United States identify as ‘Latino’ and most Latino 
people claim at least some knowledge of Spanish.17
English-Spanish bilingualism as a part of the Latino racial makeup in 
the United States is not only a feeling to those that are a part of it, but a fact 
that can be shown in socio-linguistic research. Many monolinguals in the 
United States, those who only speak one language, think that bilinguals are 
“the sum of two incomplete monolinguals,” but research shows that bilin-
guals are in fact “a unique and specific linguistic configuration.”18 Rather 
than having different sections or areas of their brains for each language, 
bilingual speakers acquire and process language in a much more complex 
way.19
Another importance facet of bilingual life is code-switching, or the 
practice of switching languages between or within sentences.20 For many 
years, “linguist and educators . . . considered this switching . . . as deviant 
and suspect,” but research into the bilingual brain shows that “code-
switching, rather than representing a debased or inferior linguistic adapta-
tion, is a verbal skill requiring a high level of linguistic ability in both lan-
guages.”21 In a study of Norwegian-English bilinguals it was found that this 
code switching happens unconsciously and that the speakers often weren’t 
even aware they were switching back and forth; “they are accustomed to 
having bilingual speakers before them, and know that whichever language 
they use, they will be understood.”22 Bilinguals never turn-off or turn-on 
one language or the other and it is in fact impossible for them to do so.23
Both languages make up their understanding of communication and the 
world around them. Put another way, “bilingualism is largely an immutable 
trait over which the individual has little, if any, conscious control.”24
 17.  Brief for The Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund and the Common-
wealth of Puerto Rican Community Affairs in the United States, as Amici Curiae in Support of Petition-
er at 3, Hernandez v. New York, 498 U.S. 894 (1990) (No. 89-76745).  
 18.  Francois Grosjean, The Bilingual as a Competent but Specific Speaker-Hearer, 6 J.
MULTILINGUAL & MULTICULTURAL DEV. 467, 468 (1985). 
 19.  Alfredo Mirande, Now That I Speak English, No Me Dejan Hablar (‘I’m Not Allowed to 
Speak’): The Implications of Hernandez v. New York, 18 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 115, 138 (1996). 
 20.  RAFAEL ART JAVIER, THE BILINGUAL MIND THINKING, FEELING AND SPEAKING IN TWO
LANGUAGES 53 (2008).  
 21.  See Evelyn P. Altenberg & Helen Smith Caims, The Effect of Phonotactic Constraints on 
Lexical Processing in Bilingual and Monolingual Subjects, 23 J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL
BEHAV. 174 (1983).  
 22.  See EINAR HAUGEN, THE NORWEGIAN LANGUAGE IN AMERICA 65 (1969). 
 23.  Mirande, supra note 19, at 146. 
 24.  Id. at 147. 
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III. LATINOS AND THE UNITED STATES JUSTICE SYSTEM
A. Hernandez v. Texas 
In 1951, Pete Hernandez was a 21 year-old Mexican-American living 
in Jackson County, Texas and working as a cotton picker.25 Following a 
disagreement that arose in a bar, Hernandez allegedly shot and killed Joe 
Espinosa.26 Hernandez was indicted for the murder by a grand jury in Jack-
son County, but prior to trial his attorney moved to quash both the indict-
ment and the jury panel.27 He asserted that persons of Mexican descent had 
been systematically excluded from jury service.28 Petitioner stated that 
because he was also Mexican-American, this exclusion deprived him of his 
equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.29 This motion 
was denied at its initial hearing, denied again when renewed at trial, and 
after Hernandez was convicted, denied by the Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals as the basis of Hernandez’s appeal.30
At the United States Supreme Court, Hernandez’s attorneys, the first 
Mexican-American attorneys to argue there, again asserted that Hernandez 
was denied his equal protection rights by the State of Texas.31 In order to 
prove this, Hernandez’s attorneys needed to establish that Mexican-
Americans were their own separate class and that this class had been actu-
ally discriminated against.32 For their first point, that Mexican-Americans 
were their own separate class, Hernandez’s attorneys pointed to the attitude 
of the community towards the Mexican-American population.33 They ar-
gued that “Latinos were, paradoxically, legally characterized as white, but 
socially treated as non-white.”34 His attorneys provided the court with tes-
timony from city officials which stated that “the community distinguished 
between ‘white’ and ‘Mexican’,” that “participation of persons of Mexican 
descent in business and community groups was shown to be slight,” and 
 25.   Hernandez v. Texas, THE STATE BAR OF TEXAS,
https://www.texasbar.com/civics/High%20School%20cases/hernandez-v-texas.html 
[https://perma.cc/MRF3-QJJB] (last visited March 11, 2020).  
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 476 (1954). 
 28.  Id. at 476-77.
 29.  Id.
 30.  Id.
 31.  Jenny Cobb, Hernandez v. Texas: “A Class Apart”, THE BULLOCK MUSEUM,
https://www.thestoryoftexas.com/discover/artifacts/hernandez-v-texas-spotlight-050115 
[https://perma.cc/KL4M-3DQ5] (last visited March 11, 2020). 
 32.  Hernandez, 347 U.S at 479. 
 33.  Id.
 34.  Bagnato, supra note 14, at 60. 
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that not long before this case reached the Court, “children of Mexican de-
scent were required to attend a segregated school for the first four 
grades.”35 Additionally they provided evidence of ‘No Mexicans Served’ 
sign in a restaurant window and that the very courthouse in which the orig-
inal trial took place had two different men’s toilets, “one unmarked, and the 
other marked ‘Colored Men’ and ‘Hombres Aqui’ (‘Men Here’).”36
Turning to their second point, that as a separate class Mexican-
American’s had been discriminated against in Jackson County, Hernan-
dez’s attorneys used a pattern of proof from an earlier discrimination case 
Norris v. Alabama.37 In Norris, plaintiffs had been able to establish prima 
facie proof of systematic discrimination by showing that some African 
Americans were qualified to serve as jurors, but none had actually been 
called.38 Here, Hernandez’s attorneys “established that 14% of the popula-
tion of Jackson County were persons with Mexican or Latin-American 
surnames, and that 11% of the males over 21 bore such names.”39 Records 
also showed that “for the last twenty-five years there is no record of any 
person with a Mexican or Latin American name having served on a jury 
commission, grand jury or petit jury in Jackson County.”40 In addition, both 
parties stipulated that “there are some male persons of Mexican or Latin 
American descent in Jackson County who, by virtue of being citizens, 
householders, or freeholders, and having all other legal prerequisites to jury 
service, are eligible to serve as members of a jury commission, grand jury 
and/or petit jury.”41
With sufficient evidence supporting both of these points, Hernandez’s 
attorneys were able to meet the burden of proof required by Norris v. Ala-
bama, and the burden shifted to the State of Texas to show that discrimina-
tion had not occurred.42 Texas had initially argued that this was not an 
appropriate case for equal protection analysis in the first place and believed 
that the Court should hold that the Fourteenth Amendment protections only 
applied to “white and Negro” citizens.43 But, following Hernandez’s suc-
cessful argument that created a separate group for Mexican-Americans, 
Texas instead provided the testimony of five jury commissioners stating 
 35.  Hernandez, 347 U.S at 479. 
 36.  Id. at 479-80. 
 37.  Id. at 480. 
 38.  Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 581 (1935). 
 39.  Hernandez, 347 U.S at 480.  
 40.  Id. at 481. 
 41.  Id.
 42.  Id.
 43.  Id. at 477.  
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that they had not discriminated, but instead were trying to “select those 
whom they thought were best qualified.”44 The Court disagreed with Texas 
on all accounts, and in a unanimous decision, stated that Texas had in fact 
violated Hernandez’s Fourteenth Amendment rights and noted that Texas 
itself had taken a broader view of the Fourteenth Amendment in prior ac-
tions.45 The Court held that while the system in Texas wasn’t inherently 
unfair and was “capable of being utilized without discrimination,” it was 
susceptible to being used by those in power in a discriminatory fashion.46
Hernandez had succeeded in showing that “people of Mexican ancestry 
constituted a separate class from white in Jackson county . . . [and despite] 
their de jure white status, Mexican Americans occupied a de facto non-
white status,”47 and that he was constitutionally entitled “to be indicted and 
tried by juries from which all members of his class are not systematically 
excluded – juries selected from among all qualified persons regardless of 
national origin or descent.”48
Writing for the majority in Hernandez Justice Warren also expounded 
on the very nature of discrimination in juries, stating that: 
Throughout our history differences in race and color have defined easily 
identifiable groups which have at times required the aid of the courts in 
securing equal treatment under the laws. But community prejudices are 
not static, and from time to time other differences from the community 
norm may define other groups which need the same protection. Whether 
such a group exists within a community is a question of fact. When the 
existence of a distinct class is demonstrated, and it is further shown that 
the laws, as written or as applied, single out that class for different treat-
ment not based on some reasonable classification, the guarantees of the 
Constitution have been violated.49
B. Hernandez v. New York
While Hernandez v. Texas served to protect the Latino population 
from being excluded from juries based on their national origin, the 1991 
Supreme Court decision in Hernandez v. New York functionally stripped 
these protections for many in ruling against bilingual jurors.50 The case 
against Dionisio Hernandez began in the New York Supreme Court, Kings 
 44.  Id. at 481. 
 45.  Id. at 477-78. 
 46.  Id. at 478-79.  
 47.  Bagnato, supra note 14, at 62 (citing Hernandez, 347 U.S. at 479-80). 
 48.  Hernandez, 347 U.S at 482 (emphasis added). 
 49.  Id. at 487.
 50.  Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358 (1991). 
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County.51 Hernandez allegedly fired shots at Charlene Calloway and her 
mother, Ada Saline, as they left a restaurant in Brooklyn.52 Charlene and 
two bystanders in the restaurant were hit by shots, but all of the victims 
survived.53 Hernandez was charged with two counts of attempted murder 
and two counts of criminal possession of a weapon.54 Before his trial be-
gan, Hernandez’s attorney objected to the striking of four potential jurors 
during the voir dire process. 55 Hernandez claimed that each of these jurors 
were Hispanic and the prosecutor had violated his equal protection rights 
by striking these jurors because they had Hispanic surnames.56 The ethnic 
origin of one of these jurors was not known, but the record showed that the 
other three were the only possible jurors with Hispanic surnames.57 The 
prosecutor asserted two different reasons for the striking of these jurors. 
First, two of the potential jurors had stated during voir dire that they had 
family members who had been convicted of crime, one of which was being 
prosecuted by the same district attorney’s office.58 Second, he stated that 
his peremptory challenges to the other two potential jurors were due to 
“specific responses and the demeanor . . . during voir dire [which] caused 
him to doubt their ability to defer to the official translation of Spanish-
language testimony.”59 The trial court accepted this reasoning and Hernan-
dez was subsequently convicted; on appeal, the New York Supreme Court 
affirmed the order of the trial court and concluded that the prosecutor’s 
explanations were race-neutral and showed a lack of intentional discrimina-
tion.60
The United States Supreme Court analyzed Hernandez’s claim using 
the framework laid out in Baston v. Kentucky.61 Batson, decided in 1986, 
created a three-part test for defendants to use in order to show that a prose-
cutor was using peremptory challenges based on race.62 When using the 
Batson test, a defendant must first make a prima facie showing that the 
challenged peremptories were based on race.63 After this prima facie show-
 51.  People v. Hernandez, 528 N.Y.S.2d 625, 626 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).  
 52.  Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 355. 
 53.  Id.
 54.  Id.
 55.  Id.
 56.  Hernandez, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 626. 
 57.  Id.
 58.  Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 355. 
 59.  Id. at 360.  
 60.  Hernandez, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 626 (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-97 (1986)). 
 61.  Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 358.  
 62.  Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98. 
 63.  Id. at 96-97. 
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ing, the prosecution must give a race-neutral reason for the challenged 
strikes.64 Finally, the court decides “whether the defendant has carried his 
burden of proving purposeful discrimination.”65 Considering Hernandez,
the Court reached a plurality opinion.66 First, the Court found that the pri-
ma facie issue was moot.67 The prosecutor had “defended his use of per-
emptory strikes without any prompting or inquiry from the trial court” and 
“the trial court had no occasion to rule that petitioner had or had not made a 
prima facie showing of intentional discrimination.”68 Even though this was 
not normal Batson procedure, the Court stated that since “the trial court . . . 
ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary 
issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing bec[ame] 
moot.”69
Next the Court turned to the prosecutor’s stated race-neutral reasons 
for striking the jurors in question. When considering if these challenges 
violated the Equal Protection Clause, the Court “assum[ed] the proffered 
reasons for the peremptory challenges are true.”70 Justice Kennedy noted 
that: 
A court addressing this issue must keep in mind the fundamental princi-
ple that “official action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it 
results in a racially disproportionate impact . . . proof of racially discrim-
inatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. Discriminatory purpose . . . implies more than intent as 
volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the deci-
sionmaker . . . selected . . . a particular course of action at least in part 
because of, not merely in spite of, its adverse effects upon an identifiable 
group.”71
Hernandez argued that “Spanish-language ability bears a close relation 
to ethnicity” and due to that ‘close relation’ the barring of a potential juror 
because they speak both English and Spanish should violate the equal pro-
tection clause.72 Specifically, Hernandez emphasized “the high correlation 
between Spanish-language ability and ethnicity in New York, where the 
case was tried.”73 Justice Kennedy stated that this argument did not need to 
 64.  Id. at 97-98. 
 65.  Id.
 66.  See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 355.  
 67.  Id. (citing U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. Of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983)). 
 68.  Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359.  
 69.  Id.
 70.  Id.
 71.  Hernandez, 500 U.S. 361 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 
252, 264-265 (1977) and Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979))  
72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. at 362. 
2020] BILINGUAL JURIES AND LATINO DISCRIMINATION 707 
be addressed because the prosecutor spoke of specific responses and de-
meanor, not excluding the jurors because of their Spanish abilities or eth-
nicity, but seems to contradict himself later in the opinion when he agreed 
that “it may well be, for certain ethnic groups and in some communities, 
that proficiency in a particular language, like skin color, should be treated 
as a surrogate for race under an equal protection analysis.”74 Turning away 
from Hernandez’s argument, the Court instead focused on the prosecutors 
reasoning behind the strikes. The prosecutor stated that he did not intend to 
exclude Latino or bilingual jurors, going as far as to point out that the vic-
tims and the witnesses in this case would also be Latino.75 Instead his focus 
was on the exact responses given by the possible jurors which made him 
doubt that they would be able to accept the official translator’s English 
translation of Spanish-language testimony.76 The Court acknowledges that 
removing Latino’s for their ethnicity would violate the Equal Protection 
clause, but stated that is not what happened here because the category of 
potential jurors who would “have difficulty in accepting the translator’s 
rendition of Spanish-language testimony . . . would include both Latinos 
and non-Latinos.”77 While allowing these types of peremptory challenges 
might have a “disproportionate impact [on prospective Latino jurors, that] 
does not turn the prosecutor’s actions into a per se violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause.”78 The Court followed up with a slippery slope argu-
ment that posited that if they allowed this to be a racial classification, “it 
would follow that a trial judge could not excuse for cause a juror whose 
hesitation convinced the judge of the juror’s inability to accept the official 
translation of foreign-language testimony.”79
Finally, the Court analyzed the finding of the trial court that Hernan-
dez failed to show purposeful discrimination.80 Here the Court emphasized 
that the issue of discrimination is a factual one, and because the trial court 
is the place for fact issues, the judgment of the trial court should be given 
deference on review.81 Using a clearly erroneous standard, the Court found 
that the trial judge’s finding was permissible, and thus the lower court fully 
 74.  Id.
 75.  Juan F. Perea, Hernandez v. New York: Courts, Prosecutors, and the Fear of Spanish, 21 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 9 (1992). 
 76.  Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 356.  
 77.  Id. at 361. 
 78.  Id.
 79.  Id.
 80.  Id. at 363 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 98). 
 81.  Id. at 364-65 (citing Batson, 476 US at 98). 
708 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 95:3 
applied the three-prong Batson test correctly and the decision was affirmed 
by the Supreme Court.82
The dissent in Hernandez v. New York focused largely on the impact 
that this decision would have and from that found a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Marshall, asserted that 
“an explanation that is race-neutral on its face is nonetheless unacceptable 
if it is merely a proxy for discriminatory practice.”83 Here the impact of a 
disqualification of a disproportionate number of Spanish-speaking jurors 
was simply too great for this prosecutor’s reasoning to be considered race-
neutral.84 Next, Stevens stated that less drastic means could have satisfied 
the prosecutor’s interests and the existence of less drastic means should 
mean the stated rationale for these peremptories should not be accepted as 
legitimate.85 Citing to Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, a case in which the 
Supreme Court stated that if an employer has alternate tests or devices that 
do not have a disproportionate impact, the tests they were using were likely 
discriminatory, Stevens argued that the trial court had the ability to instruct 
the jury on using only the official English translation as evidence or only 
allowing the jury to hear the official translation in the court room.86 Ste-
vens concluded by stating that the plurality gave far too much value to the 
prosecutor’s subjective reasoning in this case and too little value to the 
disparate impact, echoing his concurrence in the earlier Washington v. Da-
vis case in which he stated: “Frequently the most probative evidence of 
intent will be objective evidence of what actually happened rather than 
evidence describing the subjective state of mind of the actor.”87
C. Further United States Court Decisions Concerning Language 
Rights 
Courts in the United States have addressed language concerns and the 
importance of language to group classifications in various other contexts. 
In Meyers v. State, a case addressing concerns over immigrant children 
learning foreign languages and their allegiance to the United States, the 
U.S. Supreme Court recognized that a person’s language informs his or her 
ideas, experiences, and perceptions of the world.88 Language was an im-
 82.  Id. at 372.  
 83.  Id. at 379 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
 84.  Id. at 376 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
 85.  Id.
 86.  Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 375 (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 
(1975)).  
 87.  Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976).  
 88.  See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
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portant characteristic of the country that a person had emigrated from, and 
thus in a post-World War I world, could be a factor of concern regarding 
where their loyalties lie.89 This assumption of language being able to define 
a group was echoed in different circumstances in United States v. Benmu-
har.90 There, the First Circuit found that the sole use of English in Puerto 
Rico’s federal courts was constitutional.91 While this ruling was a blow to 
those who believed the Spanish-speaking population was being disadvan-
taged by the practice, the court assumed argumentatively that language 
ability constituted a basis for defining a distinct group, Spanish-speaking 
Puerto Ricans.92 A final important case to consider when looking at lan-
guage and the United States justice system is United States v. Dempsey out 
of the Tenth Circuit.93 There the court held that the presence of a thirteenth 
person during deliberations, that person being a sign language interpreter 
for a deaf juror, was allowed and did not pose confidentiality problems, 
inhibit juror deliberation, or deprive the defendant of a fair and impartial 
jury trial.94 The court also addressed a possible issue with interpretation. 
Hoffman, the deaf juror in the case, was able to read lips and because of 
this the court stated that she provided a check on incompetent or slanted 
interpretation because she would be able to check the accuracy of much of 
the interpreter’s translation. 95
IV. PEREMPTORY STRIKES OF BILINGUAL JURORS IN CASES WITH 
SPANISH LANGUAGE TESTIMONY AMOUNT TO DISCRIMINATION AGAINST 
LATINOS IN THE UNITED STATES AND SHOULD BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Hernandez v. New York was incorrectly decided for three reasons: 
first, Spanish bilingualism and Latino ethnicity are so closely tied that per-
emptory exclusion of English-Spanish bilingual jurors should not meet 
Batson standards; second, even if a Batson violation was not found, the 
concerns articulated by the prosecutor in Hernandez v. New York are un-
founded and an example of a current community prejudice stemming from 
national origin as warned against in Hernandez v. Texas; and finally, allow-
ing peremptory strikes against English-Spanish jurors sacrifices crucially 
important principles of law and justice in favor of imagined efficiency. 
 89.  See id.
 90.  See United States v. Benmuhar, 658 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1981). 
 91.  Id. at 20. 
 92.  Id. at 19.
 93.  United States v. Dempsey, 830 F.2d 1084, 1088 (10th Cir. 1987). 
 94.  See id.
 95.  Id.
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A. Hernandez v. New York was Incorrectly Decided and the Prosecu-
tor’s Actions Were in Violation of the Test Articulated in 
Batson v. Kentucky 
A deeper understanding of Latino American ethnicity and English-
Spanish bilingualism shows that English-Spanish bilingualism is simply a 
facet of ethnicity, not a separate characteristic of Latino Americans. Race is 
not only the defining factor of Batson analysis, but has always been that of 
Equal Protection analysis because the anti-discrimination regime arose out 
of the post-civil war amendments created to eliminate unequal treatment of 
African-Americans.96 This focus on race has always meant that “a racial 
classification regardless of purported motivations, is presumptively invalid 
and can be upheld only upon extraordinary justification.”97 As noted above, 
the prosecutor in Hernandez v. New York stated that the peremptory strikes 
related to the juror’s hesitancy about agreeing to listen solely to the inter-
preter’s testimony rather than the original Spanish testimony, but no tran-
script was made of this voir dire examination at the original trial.98 Instead 
what the Court had to decide on were the prosecutors own words: 
We talked to them for a long time; the Court talked to them, I talked to 
them. I believe that in their heart they will try to follow it [the interpret-
er’s translation], but I felt there was a great deal of uncertainty as to 
whether they could accept the interpreter as the final arbiter of what was 
said by each of the witnesses, especially where there were going to be 
Spanish-speaking witnesses . . . I didn’t feel, when I asked them whether 
or not they could accept the interpreter’s translation of it, I didn’t feel 
they could. They each looked away from me and said with some hesitan-
cy that they would try, not that they could, but that they would try to fol-
low the interpreter . . . I feel that in a case where the interpreter will be 
for the main witnesses, they would have an undue impact upon the ju-
ry.99
These statements are problematic under Batson for two main reasons. 
First, there is no evidence that the prosecutor questioned any other mem-
bers of the venire panel about their abilities to speak Spanish.100 Addition-
ally, the prosecutor assumed the language competency of the two Latino 
jurors before any questioned were asked to actually assess that competen-
cy.101 This suggests that the prosecutor himself inherently equates Spanish 
 96.  Mirande, supra note 19, at 132. 
 97.  Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272. 
 98.  Mirande, supra note 19, at 117. 
99. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 356-57. 
 100.  People v. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d 621, 628 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (Kaye, J., dissenting).  
 101.  Mirande, supra note 19, at 146. 
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and English-Spanish bilingualism with the Latino race, while simultaneous-
ly trying to say that this is not why the jurors were targeted. Both jurors 
questioned by the prosecution also stated that they would abide by the in-
structions, the prosecutor even stated this in his own testimony, but the 
prosecution decided that these assurances could not be true.102 As suggest-
ed by the dissent during the Court of Appeals phase of the Hernandez case, 
a true strike based on inability to abide by translation should be a strike for 
cause.103 Here, jurors could not be stricken for cause because they had not 
stated they could not follow the instruction, so instead this inability was 
shifted into being the purported race neutral reason for striking. 
The main criticisms of the Batson framework arise from beliefs that it 
simply isn’t effective when tasked with discovering more discrete prejudic-
es.104 This criticism is rooted in the fact that a prosecutor who is predis-
posed to discriminate will not be hard pressed to find a supposedly race 
neutral reason to remove a juror and they will be “afforded ample oppor-
tunity to discriminate.”105 How this case plays out is an almost perfect illus-
tration of that concern. Here, the Court relied almost exclusively on the 
prosecutors’ testimony regarding the reasoning for the strikes, did not seem 
to consider the surrounding evidence, and chose not to consider the impact 
the prosecutors actions had upon the jury.106 The Court “created a proce-
dural side-show, a promise of equal protection devoid of substantive con-
tent.”107 Additionally, the prosecutors’ reasoning made little sense 
considering the manner that questioning of prospective jurors was conduct-
ed. Only jurors singled out based on their Latino race were asked questions 
about their Spanish language abilities. They were struck based on their 
bilingualism as an assumed, and inherent, part of their race. 
B. Even if a Batson Violation was Not Found, The Prosecutor’s Ac-
tions Represent a Current Community Prejudice as Warned Against in 
Hernandez v. Texas
An argument could be made that this exclusion could not amount to a 
Batson violation due to the multi-racial makeup of English-Spanish bilin-
guals in the United States, but even if this argument was successful, the 
 102.  Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d at 627 (Kaye, J., dissenting). 
 103.  Id.
 104.  See Alan Raphael, Discriminatory Jury Selection: Lower Court Implementation of Batson v. 
Kentucky, 25 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 293, 317 (1989). 
 105.  James S. Wrona, Hernandez v. New York: Allowing Bias to Continue in the Jury Selection 
Process, 19 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 151, 160 (1992). 
 106.  Id. at 161. 
 107.  Perea, supra note 75, at 15.  
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concerns articulated by the prosecutor in Hernandez v. New York are un-
founded and an example of a current community prejudice stemming from 
national origin as warned against in Hernandez v. Texas and deemed un-
constitutional by the Court. While the holding in Hernandez v. Texas was 
made in relation to a Mexican-American defendant, the legal principal has 
been applied more widely to Latinos in general and language is an indivisi-
ble part of that holding. As noted previously, evidence used in order to 
prove the separate status of Mexican-American’s included segregation 
signs in Spanish and evidence to show discrimination included the records 
of residents with Spanish surnames. This emphasis on Spanish language 
may or may not have been intentional, but it was unavoidable “because 
language is a quasi-immutable trait, [and] discrimination on the basis of 
language is functionally equivalent to discrimination on the basis of nation-
al origin.”108
Writing the opinion for Hernandez v. Texas, Justice Warren made the 
choice to leave the door open for groups not yet considered to show dis-
crimination in the future. To allow groups to define themselves and the 
discrimination they faced in the context of their own time, rather than stat-
ing that the constitution provided for a ‘static’ definition of prejudice.109
This definition should be correctly applied to include a current community 
prejudice in the United States against Spanish speakers, and within that 
group, English-Spanish bilinguals. This potential for prejudice around lan-
guage was in fact recognized by the Court in the Hernandez v. New York
opinion: “Just as a shared language can serve to foster a community, lan-
guage differences can be a source of division. Language elicits a response 
from others, ranging from admiration and respect, to distance and aliena-
tion, to ridicule and scorn.”110
Warren’s framework states that the existence of a current community 
prejudice is “a question of fact,”111 and facts about the current climate to-
wards Latino-Americans and English-Spanish bilinguals demonstrate this 
prejudice. Studies culminating in 2018 have shown that hate crimes are on 
the rise generally in the United States.112 In a recent poll, 4 out of 10 Lati-
nos in the United States stated that they have personally experienced dis-
 108.  See Mari Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law and Jurisprudence for 
the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329 (1991). 
 109.  See Hernandez, 347 U.S. at 478. 
 110.  Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. at 369-70.  
 111.  Hernandez, 347 U.S. at 478. 
 112.  Dani Anguiano, “It’s Worse than Ever”: How Latinos are Changing their Lives in Trump’s 
America, THE GUARDIAN (October 7, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2019/oct/06/latinos-trump-hate-crimes-el-paso [https://perma.cc/YG82-CL5J]. 
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crimination in the last year.113 Many specifically cited being told to “go 
back to Mexico” or go back to “where they came from” after speaking 
Spanish in public places.114 These aggressors had a specific prejudice to-
wards Spanish language because they viewed it as an inherent part of being 
an outsider, being unamerican. Those who spoke Spanish, whether it was 
their sole language or one of many, were their own unique group. 
The second step in Justice Warren’s formula for showing a current 
community prejudice is demonstrating that the identified class has been 
singled out for unequal treatment by the laws and that this unequal treat-
ment is “not based on some reasonable classification.”115 The prosecutor, 
and later the Supreme Court in Hernandez v. New York, stated that it was 
okay for bilingual jurors to be treated differently in multilingual cases be-
cause of concerns about their ability to listen to and accept the English 
language translation of Spanish language testimony.116 But the line of ques-
tioning engaged in by the prosecutor was  based on a fundamental misun-
derstanding of how bilinguals comprehend language and created an 
unreasonable divide between English-Spanish bilingual jurors and mono-
lingual English speaking jurors. The Prosecutor asked bilingual jurors if 
they could guarantee that they would adhere to the English language trans-
lation of testimony, but this question is nearly impossible for the juror to 
answer in the abstract. To answer this question, a possible juror “must have 
some assurance that the interpretation will be faithful to the testimony and 
correct.”117 This seems like a given to those who work in the criminal jus-
tice system regularly, but a juror, especially a Latino bilingual juror who 
would thus far has been largely disenfranchised by the justice system, may 
not understand this basis. Functionally, the prosecutor was asking jurors to 
“pledge allegiance to a potentially false interpretation.”118 This created 
confusion for the jurors, with one of the excluded Hernandez jurors later 
stating in an interview, “[t]he problem . . . is that if there were a discrepan-
cy in the Spanish and English, I wouldn’t know how to deal with it.”119
Choosing to exclude all English-Spanish bilinguals, and by extension a 
majority of Latinos, from juries is not a “reasonable” way to handle this 
confusion though. There are already existing procedures for jurors to ask 
questions of a judge or clarify confusion. These could easily be used to 
 113.  Id.  
 114.  Id.
115.  Hernandez, 347 U.S. at 478. 
 116.  See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 371.  
 117.  Perea, supra note 75, at 29. 
 118.  Id.  
 119.  Id. at 30.  
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allow bilingual jurors to ask questions if they arose and if the translation is 
done correctly, the questions should not arise in the first place. The ease 
with which the justice system could choose to involve these jurors, rather 
than excluding a large group of Americans from jury service, fulfills the 
second prong of Justice Warren’s current community prejudice standard 
and thus this treatment of bilingual jurors should be unconstitutional. 
C. Current Jurisprudence Concerning Bilingual Jurors Values Effi-
ciency and Ease Over the Constitutional Rights of Bilingual American Citi-
zens and Must Be Corrected 
In Offutt v. United States, Justice Frankfurter stated that “justice must 
satisfy the appearance of justice.”120 This statement has proven to be ex-
tremely true in modern American society, especially at the intersection of 
issues of justice and race where it is has been shown time and time again 
that justice is nothing without legitimacy. One example of this can be found 
in the aftermath of the Rodney King case and the riots that engulfed Los 
Angeles following the verdict. There, an all-white jury did not convict 
white police officers of a brutal beating of a black man.121 The public could 
not find justice in this verdict “because [the jury’s] composition lacked 
legitimacy.”122 The violence and destruction that followed this verdict “is a 
forceful reminder that the appearance of justice matters. Whether or not 
justice was done in the case, the appearance of justice was absent.”123 Re-
moving entire groups from juries creates a lack of legitimacy in the verdict 
they hand down. It also has effects on the verdict itself. As stated by Justice 
Marshall in Peters v. Kiff:
When any large and identifiable segment of the community is excluded 
from jury service, the effect is to remove from the jury room qualities of 
human nature and varieties of human experience . . . unknown and per-
haps unknowable. It is not necessary to assume that the excluded group 
will consistently vote as a class in order to conclude, as we do, that its 
exclusion deprives the jury of a perspective on human events that may 
have unsuspected importance in any case that may be presented.124
This principle remains true when the group excluded is identified by 
the languages they speak. When English-Spanish bilinguals are removed 
from juries in cases that use Spanish translation and this removal amounts 
 120.  348 U.S. 11, 13 (1954). 
 121.  Perea, supra note 75, at 2. 
 122.  Id.
 123.  Id.
 124.  Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1972). 
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to the near total exclusion of Latino jurors, “the fabric of the legal system is 
undone.”125 Latinos have historically been excluded from juries in the 
United States “because they did not know English. After Hernández [sic], 
they can be excluded because they do.”126 This linguistic exclusion of 
United States citizens does not serve to benefit the United States criminal 
justice system. As the United States continues to diversify, the judicial 
system must focus on continued inclusion because “linguistic inclusion of 
an individual in any judicial community, as opposed to their linguistic ex-
clusion, can only foster . . . collaboration in any judicial proceeding.”127
Exclusion not only infringes on the equal protection rights of Latino Amer-
icans, but also continues to foster a distrust of the judicial system in Latino 
communities.128
The reasoning laid out in Hernandez v. New York and its progeny rep-
resent a line of thinking that values courtroom efficiency over rules which 
best promote justice and principles of law. It values ease over the reality of 
functionally excluding an entire race of American jurors. But constitutional 
principles are not based on ease, and the American criminal justice cannot 
continue to “exclude Spanish-speakers from jury because of illusory race 
neutral means.”129 The fears articulated by the prosecutor and the Court in 
Hernandez are not truly fears about the comprehension abilities of bilingual 
jurors, but instead “the possibility that the interpreter’s ‘official’ version of 
Spanish-language testimony will be materially different from the actual 
Spanish-language testimony.”130 The prosecutor and Court’s desire to get a 
bilingual juror to commit to only listening to one language, an impossibility 
for the bilingual brain, would not  be a concern if they were positive that 
“[the interpreter’s] testimony was identical in content to the Spanish-
language testimony.”131 Unfortunately, this is not always the case. There is 
ample evidence in both state and federal courts that interpreters frequently 
may not be accurate because of the great difficulty of their task.132 Some of 
these inaccuracies are inherent in the interpretation process, even when you 
have a highly qualified interpreter.133 Unlike a witness who simply answers 
 125.  Douds, supra note 2 at 747.  
 126.  Mirande, supra note 19, at 148. 
 127.  Cynthia M. Costas-Centivany, Language Rights in Criminal and Civil Court Proceedings: 
Their Constitutional Protection in Spain vs. Puerto Rico, 42 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 407, 420 (2012) 
 128.  Wrona, supra note 105, at 157. 
 129.  Bagnato, supra note 14, at 66.  
 130.  Perea, supra note 75, at 21. 
 131.  Id.  
 132.  See ROSEANN D. GONZÁLEZ ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF COURT INTERPRETATION: THEORY,
POLICY, AND PRACTICE, 47-55 (Carolina Academic Press 1991). 
 133.  Perea, supra note 75, at 23.  
716 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 95:3 
questions, “interpreters challenge and correct attorneys as they ask ques-
tions of [a] witness.”134 Additionally, “if a witness gives a nonsensical an-
swer to an attorney’s question, interpreters may attempt to explain such 
answers and clarify the situation, rather than simply interpret the witness’s 
testimony.”135 This explanation and clarification is somewhat inevitable, as 
interpreters do not want their skills to be seen as inadequate because the 
witness is speaking incoherently. The process of translation also changes 
the jurors’ relationship with witnesses even when done correctly. The in-
terpreter distances jurors from the witness and interpreters are often known 
to “lengthen testimony when they convert Spanish into English, changing 
what is originally a powerful speech style into a powerless one, by adding 
verbal hedges, hesitations, and polite forms.”136
Once the difficulties with interpretations in United States courtrooms 
are considered, it becomes clear that the problem is not actually with bilin-
gual jurors, but instead with the interpretation itself. Here the exclusion of 
bilingual jurors, and the de facto exclusion of Latino jurors, becomes even 
more egregious because they have the ability to improve the system great-
ly. If translation in a courtroom was being done correctly, it would not 
matter if bilingual jurors heard it in both Spanish and English. It would 
mean the same thing and according to the most recent research about bilin-
guals, detailed above, it would likely be understood concurrently as one 
whole. Additionally, even with correct testimony, bilingual jurors would be 
uniquely situated to judge witness credibility and emotion which are lost on 
many jurors in the distance created by the translation process. If translation 
was in fact being done incorrectly, “Spanish-speakers, and Latinos deriva-
tively . . . could reach more accurate and just ends then [sic] non-Spanish-
speakers.”137 They would be aware of the errors as they occurred and 
would have the ability to improve the trial process by facilitating more 
accurate fact-finding.138 Jurors acting in this manner would not be unprece-
dented, as illustrated above in the Dempsey case. The Tenth Circuit Court 
affirmatively stated that Dempsey’s ability to listen to the sign language 
testimony and check its accuracy with her ability to read lips was a positive 
to the justice system and the trial process.139 The inclusion of English-
Spanish bilinguals and American Latinos would similarly improve the jus-
 134.  Id. at 23-24.  
 135.  Id. at 24. 
 136.  Id.
 137.  Bagnato, supra note 14, at 66. 
 138.  See Perea, supra note 75, at 4.  
 139.  See Dempsey, 830 F.2d at 1088-89. 
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tice system due to their ability to act as safeguards in trials that have Eng-
lish and Spanish speaking witnesses or multilingual documents. 
V. CONCLUSION
In 2008, a Mexican man was beaten to death in Shenandoah, Pennsylva-
nia by four high school-aged white males.140 As they beat him, they yelled 
racial slurs relating to his Latino ethnicity and national origin. They told by-
standers who looked Latino to “go back to Mexico” and “get out of Shenando-
ah or you will be lying next to him.”141 At their murder trial in Pennsylvania 
state court, the men were found guilty of only simple assault.142 The reason? 
During deliberations, “jurors were too busy indulging their prejudice and per-
haps looking for a way to spare the teenagers long prison sentences.”143 Here, 
an all-white jury “found it easier to relate to the white ‘all-America[n] boys’ 
sitting at the defendant’s table than to the Mexican immigrant lying in the 
morgue.”144 While it is impossible to know what a different racial make-up of 
the jury would have done to the verdict in this case, it does not defy logic to 
make the assumption that if a Latino American had been present on that jury, 
they would have spoken up for the victim. This case illustrates why it is im-
portant for juries to have a diverse make-up of races, ages, and experiences. As 
noted above, when an entire group is removed from this process, the process is 
destroyed. The success of the criminal trial jury relies on its ability to assess 
the situation from diverse viewpoints. 
By following the holding in Hernandez v. New York, which cleared the 
way for peremptory strikes based on bilingual abilities in trials that will in-
volve Spanish language evidence, Courts have been enabling this destruction. 
Allowing de facto discrimination against Latino American citizens and their by 
and large removal from the American jury because of language abilities. This 
mistake is especially egregious because the results should be unconstitutional 
under both Batson v. Kentucky and Hernandez v. Texas, along with being terri-
ble policy for a diversifying country. Allowing bilingual jurors to serve in 
bilingual trials not only improves the justice system as a whole, it is, most 
importantly the only way to respect the constitutional rights of Latino Ameri-
cans.
 140.  Bagnato, supra note 14, at 60. 
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